"Austria underestimates the danger if Ukraine loses the war"

Rudolphina: Donald Trump's presidency shows again very clearly that the fate of Ukraine will also depend on the policy of the US superpower. What parallels from history do you see with this situation? 

Philipp Ther: Historical comparisons are tricky, but the situation in Ukraine is reminiscent of the Sudetenland in 1938. This part of Czechoslovakia was handed over to Hitler in the Munich Agreement without the country being allowed to sit at the negotiating table. Something similar could happen to Ukraine because of Trump. He wants to be seen as the great dealmaker and end the war at any cost – if necessary, over the heads of the Ukrainians. I am concerned that Putin will take advantage of this. 

In the past and in the present, the arrogance of the superpowers has also surfaced by belittling the country concerned. According to the minutes of the 1938 negotiations, one of the British negotiators said that he would bring "those Czechos” to terms, which is a very pejorative rhetoric. Trump is now doing the same with Ukraine – even before Zelensky was humiliated in the White House, he called him a dictator and blamed Ukraine for the continuation of the war. 

Also in 1938, the roles of perpetrator and victim were reversed. When they talked about "minority problems", they marked the minorities in Europe as the cause of the problem. This resulted in the abolishment of the protection of minorities and the Czech minority in the border regions was abandoned to the Nazis. False simplifications can therefore have fatal consequences and, unfortunately, I have to criticise the media somehow for this when they talk about the "Ukraine war”, although the cause of the war is Putin's Russia.

Rudolphina: Can the perpetrator-victim reversal also explain why parts of the Austrian population sympathise with the Russian perspective on the conflict?

Philipp Ther: Austria is relatively Russia-friendly, despite its experiences with Russia as the occupying power until 1955. But that was probably too long ago. In addition, the Red Army was partly seen as a liberator, though it has to be said that the liberating forces consisted not only of Russian but also Ukrainian soldiers. Today, the merits of 1945 are attributed solely to Russia, while Ukraine is ignored in this narrative. 

Anti-Americanism also plays a role, in which Russia is idealised as the antithesis of the US, especially among old leftists. Additionally, gratitude for the creation of the Austrian State Treaty and the country's neutrality plays a role. However, this entailed a massive encroachment on sovereign rights and for a long time prevented Austria from joining the European Community (today’s European Union) (see State Treaty Article 4). However, this is no longer in the minds of many people. In addition, there is the pro-Russia attitude of the right-wing populist Freedom Party (FPÖ). 

I believe that many people massively underestimate the risks for Austria if Ukraine loses this war. It is no longer a question of how much you are personally inclined towards Russia or Ukraine; it is about security-related consequences for Austria. 

Rudolphina: Elsewhere, in contrast, people are nervous, for example in Finland, the Baltic states, Poland. People in these countries generally seem to have a different perception of Russia. How can we explain this from a historic point of view?

Philipp Ther: Many Eastern European nations were under Russian rule for a long time, so these are historical experiences. In the Czech Republic, people still actively remember the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, in Hungary the uprising of 1956. However, it also depends on the government’s perception of Russia. As an authoritarian leader, Viktor Orbán gets on well with Putin, but is also pursuing economic interests: Russia is expanding the nuclear power plant in Paks. Gas and oil are at stake. In Austria, we have not yet really analysed our connections to Russia, and not only the monetary connections. We have seen that the Russian secret service FSB has high-ranking employees in Austria, in the case of Jan Marsalek.

Rudolphina: The current situation is the result of growing tensions between Russia and the EU or the "West". How far do you have to go back in history to understand the causes?

Philipp Ther: Putin thinks of geopolitics as a zero-sum game: If others win something, I lose, and vice versa. The fact that he sees the EU as competition was evident in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007.

There are also longer-term causes, such as the Russian economic crisis in the 1990s, where the transformation towards the West failed, for various reasons. The economic reforms did not work, which was partly due to the Western advisors. Moreover, democracy did not prevail. 

The eastward expansion of NATO in 1999 and 2004 are sometimes seen as the reason for the alienation. The timing was inappropriate in some respects, if we look at the illegal US invasion of Iraq. Ultimately, however, the new NATO members were admitted because they wanted to be, as a reaction to Russia's increasingly imperial behaviour.

However, the causes of the alienation between Russia and Europe are very complex overall. The West has also made mistakes. Austria is no exception. When it comes to issuing visas, special permits and the sale of property, etc., we bargained with oligarchs and favoured them. What kind of signal does this send to the population or Putin? That the West, too, is corrupt and that it favours thieves.

Rudolphina: What does Putin have to gain in Ukraine anyway?

Philipp Ther: Imperialism is an outlet for internal tensions. Whenever Putin's popularity at home has waned, he has provoked conflict abroad. Russian nationalism distracts from internal deficits and great poverty in the country. 

This ideology is about dominance in the post-Soviet regions. It is therefore wrong to assume that things will calm down if peace is imposed on Ukraine. The great danger of making major concessions to Russia is to encourage it to take future action against the Baltic states, for example, by claiming to protect Russian minorities near the border. 

Rudolphina: This seems to be a scenario in which NATO is no longer a deterrent.

Philipp Ther: This might happen, we do not know. What we know is that the risk of war in Europe has increased massively since the beginning of the year. We should think about what this means for Austria considering its geopolitical situation. A reference to the Cold War is useful here. If the Cold War had become "hot", one possible scenario would have been the Warsaw Pact advancing through Austria to West Germany. Neutrality would have been of as little use to us ‒ as it was to Belgium in the First World War. 

Rudolphina: Europe is now setting the course for rearmament. How do you assess this strategy in the light of history?

Philipp Ther: Regardless of what the US does next, it should be in Europe's strategic interest to protect itself. If Ukraine falls, the continent's largest pro-Western army will be eliminated, and Europe will be weakened. This is reminiscent of 1938, when the Munich Agreement neutralised the Czechoslovak army and paved the way for Hitler's occupation. These are worrying parallels. History never repeats itself exactly the same way, but the lesson for today is clear: Europe must be ready to defend itself ‒ and so does Austria. Internationally, we have long been regarded as free riders.

Rudolphina: Immediately after the start of the war, you said in an interview that entering into dialogue with Russia would not be effective at the moment. What is the situation today?

Philipp Ther: You have to be very careful about the signal you send when offering dialogue. It would have been wrong back then, but it is different today. The US may not have acted thoughtfully, but perhaps their actions will nevertheless generate some positive momentum. Non-official communication channels can also be used. There is a suppressed but still rudimentary civil society. Not all Russians are enthusiastic about the war. Maintaining personal contacts with Russia, if you have any, is very important. And then you should talk about the war. I believe there is resonance in Russian society for entering into dialogue.