Hungary as a touchstone – how much autocracy can the EU take?

On 12 April 2026, Hungary once again made history. What seemed almost unthinkable just a few weeks, or even days, ago has now become reality. Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party, which has been ruling in an increasingly autocratic manner for the past twelve years, has suffered a crushing election defeat by a party that was virtually unknown until recently and has only emerged as the main opposition party under Péter Magyar since 2024. Far beyond Hungary, this election outcome is being celebrated not simply as a change of government, but as a regime change. But how can a country which is today considered an 'electoral autocracy' still be an EU member state? Why does this election also affect EU citizens beyond Hungary? When does a democracy stop being a democracy?

Why the EU has been a passive observer for far too long

You would think that an autocratic state cannot be a member of the EU. The EU considers itself a community of shared values, which has enshrined democracy, rule of law and human rights in its treaties. Furthermore, the EU has developed mechanisms to sanction members that violate these values. However, these mechanisms do not always have the desired effect. But is Hungary even an autocracy? After all, even under Viktor Orbán, this country regularly holds parliamentary elections.

Throughout the evening of the election, pro-government media outlets continued to stress that the defeat of the Fidesz party was proof that Hungary is a functioning democracy. Observers note that the Fidesz party has been systematically changing central institutions of representative democracy since 2010, thereby significantly restricting the rule of law, separation of powers and fundamental rights. Key changes include, for example, the new constitution of 2011 which significantly increased the powers of the government, various reforms of election law in favour of Fidesz, the massive restriction of freedom of the media and public discourse, the restriction of civil society organisations, attacks on the freedom of academia, repressive asylum and migration policies as well as the restriction of the rights of sexual minorities.

When does a democracy cease to be one?

Political scientists call this an 'electoral autocracy'. This term is used to refer to political regimes in which multi-party elections effectively take place, but the elections fail to comply with democratic standards due to serious irregularities, restriction of the competition between parties and other institutional restrictions. This alone does not make Hungary a closed autocracy, meaning that the government is not chosen in elections or that there is no electoral competition. Yet, Hungary is far from the EU ideal of a liberal democracy.

These various types of regimes already show that it is not exactly easy to determine when exactly a democracy stops being a democracy. Furthermore, the erosion of democratic rights is often a creeping process, just like in the case of Hungary. Academic literature uses the term 'democratic backsliding' to describe this process of erosion, which takes place gradually and involves changes of legislature and institutions. Other authors refer to a 'death by a thousand cuts'. This could be one of the reasons why the EU has for such a long time done remarkably little to combat the process of autocratisation in Hungary. It is not an easy feat to determine which cut is the decisive one that marks the end of a democratic regime.

Toothless regulations? Why sanctions have little impact

Another reason is that, in reality, the European sanction mechanisms are relatively toothless. Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union is the most effective weapon the EU has. It enables them to take measures if it determines the existence of a serious and persistent breach of the values of the EU. Hungary has been subject to an Article 7 procedure since 2018. However, to determine relevant breaches and impose sanctions, the European Council must act by a qualified majority. And as long as Hungary has allies covering its back, it is impossible to achieve a majority. Poland, led by the right-wing conservative PiS party, has often acted as Hungary's ally.

However, it would be short-sighted to only consider institutional reasons when discussing why Hungary is still able to cause 'mischief' in the EU despite obvious breaches of the EU's fundamental values. We have to take into account two additional factors. On the one hand, the EU has adopted a very specific understanding of democracy, i.e. that of liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, democracy is a disputed term. Two different dimensions of democracy are commonly contrasted – liberal democracy versus majoritarian democracy. While the former emphasises the separation of powers, the rule of law, the protection of minorities and individual liberties, the latter emphasises majority decisions and national interests.

The EU and most of its member states have mostly sided with liberal democracy and its juridification of politics. What is often overlooked here is that this understanding also has its downsides. Many people have the impression that European Law, the constitutional court and other institutions such as independent central banks undermine the independence of politics and restrict democratic self-determination.

What makes an 'illiberal democracy' so appealing?

It is into this context that Orbán has inserted the term 'illiberal democracy'. In a speech in 2014, he used this term to describe a political system characterised by elections and multi-party competition, in which the government derives its legitimacy from majorities and national interests, rather than from liberal principles and the rule of law. So, when Orbán criticises liberal democracy, he picks up on a widespread feeling of unease about democracy.

Many people are currently experiencing a political system that neither takes their voice sufficiently into account nor is able to solve their problems, while they feel under pressure due to considerable economic and cultural changes. Against this background, an illiberal democracy that seemingly focuses more on majority decisions, national community and the political ability to act may appear attractive. It is crucial to take political action to address this sense of unease about liberal democracy – it cannot be eradicated solely through procedures.

Is the EU part of the problem?

On the other hand, in the EU there is a yawning gap between expectations and reality. It is noticeable that the European People’s Party (EPP – the group of conservative and Christian democratic parties in the European Parliament) has protected Orbán's Fidesz party for years and has repeatedly blocked and diluted more drastic measures against Hungary. In this context, Daniel Keleman writes of an authoritarian equilibrium in the EU, according to which the structures of the EU contribute to stabilising autocracies instead of weakening them. This equilibrium is based on the Fidesz party helping the EPP achieve mandates and majorities in the European Parliament, while the EPP holds its protective hand over this party.

It is important to add that some members of the EPP also share many 'illiberal' positions of the Fidesz party. For example, the refugee policy that violates human rights – a policy which Hungary merely pioneered and which is now also supported by the EU. As recently revealed, the EPP is now collaborating with radical right-wing groups to work on a legislative proposal aimed at tightening migration policy – this shows that the EPP has learnt nothing from the case of Hungary. The EU is therefore not only the victim, but also part of the problem.

Further information about democracy and human rights

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• Save the date: Semester question closing event on Monday, 22 June 2026, 18:00, Main Ceremonial Hall, Main Building of the University of Vienna Guest: Volker Türk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
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