Democracy and human rights – a 'complicated' relationship?

What do you value more: the freedom to say something controversial – or the filtering of fake news and disinformation? Strict requirements regarding social media to protect children and adolescents, elections and user data – or freedom of information without any regulation? The majority's unlimited power to make decisions, for example about a marginalised group’s right to exercise their religion – or fundamental rights that are not up for debate and protect minority rights towards the majority?

The relationship between democracy and human rights is not always an entirely harmonious one – this has always been the case for as long as human rights have existed (editors' note: since 1945/1948 in modern understanding). Democracy is the legitimate decision-making process exercised by a majority of citizens through free and fair elections as well as transparent procedures; human rights define limits for the majority and protect the rights of each individual, including those of individuals belonging to a minority group.

And yet, however often they clash, democracy and human rights still need each other. "Whenever democracy comes under pressure, human rights usually suffer too – and vice versa," said Michael Lysander Fremuth, an expert on international law, during the kick-off event of the new Research Network for Democracy and Human Rights, which he is leading together with democracy researcher Sylvia Kritzinger at the University of Vienna.

We asked the political scientist and the legal expert to describe current areas of tension between democracy and human rights, based on examples and from the perspectives of social sciences and law.

Sylvia Kritzinger: "Democracy needs to be explained from time to time"

For me, democracy and human rights are not so much in a constant struggle but rather involved in a fascinating dance – including friction where social norms are shifting. Political stakeholders have noticeably shifted the discourse in the past 20 to 25 years. Things that used to be 'unsayable' or 'unacceptable' have gradually been normalised.

This also affects democratic practices, for example when you think about what we political scientists call 'losers' consent'. This term refers to voters' willingness to accept election defeat, the outcome of coalition talks, i.e. the formation of a coalition, and institutional procedures such as the legislative process. In electoral systems based on proportional representation, such as in Austria, the party that won most votes on election day may ultimately not be involved in the government. In contrast to majority electoral systems, it is rare in proportional representation systems for a party to win both a majority of the votes and an absolute majority of seats in parliament (the few exceptions include, for example, the single-party governments led by Bruno Kreisky in Austria in the 1970s). Therefore, after an election, parties seek to form a majority, which then results in a coalition government.
 

To vote is not to choose

In parliamentary democracies, such as in Austria, it is therefore common for several parties to cooperate in coalition governments. However, coalitions are characterised by compromise, so not every party in the coalition government will be able to fulfil the election pledges they made in the run-up to the election. Due to this two-stage process it is thus possible that the party winning most votes on election day is ultimately not part of the government, if it is unable to find a coalition partner with which it can garner the majority of seats in parliament.

The 'winners' of an election may thus turn out to be the 'losers' of coalition talks. We can see that this has a negative effect on satisfaction with democracy overall and specifically with democratic institutions, as observed also in Austria in recent years. As a consequence, voters are less likely to accept the outcome of this democratic process, i.e. finding a majority in political decision-making processes, and thus to accept becoming 'losers' in this process of forming a coalition.

Compromise – a dirty word?

This is where populist logic – "We are in the majority and since we have 'won' the election, our preferences must be accepted and fully implemented" – meets the rigid system of finding majorities and consensus, the rule of law and checks and balances. In the period between the day of the election and the formation of a coalition, these democratic processes can be explained through communication, thereby potentially increasing the acceptance of procedures.

But at the same time, we must part with the idea that simply providing information about democratic practices is enough to decrease discontent with the outcome of elections or coalition talks and thus also with democracy. Some people simply do not want to be reached or are unwilling to accept information that does not align with their views. Casting your vote on the ballot paper is therefore only one, albeit substantial, part of participation – it does not decide democratic outcomes, such as the formation of a government.

The invisible pillars of democracy

Another challenge that democracy is currently facing, as I see it, is the fact that a growing number of people living, working and paying taxes in democratic countries are not represented in the political system. In Austria, this affects roughly 1.5 million people. This representation gap is problematic from a democratic theory perspective – and it is a matter of political controversy. How are these citizens represented if they do not have the right to vote? Which areas of tension emerge? And how do these people experience fundamentals of democracy such as fairness, democratic processes and protection of minorities?

This means that democratic practices in our representative democracies need to be defined and understood in much broader terms than is sometimes the case. Raising awareness and promoting acceptance of this issue is a core task which academia, the media and politics should tackle time and again. But raising awareness alone is not enough. To prevent the spiral of mistrust and feelings of political marginalisation, which could ultimately lead to political unrest or even the breakdown of democracy, it is crucial to take concrete efforts to reduce the latent dissatisfaction with the political system, dispel the notion of 'us against them', strengthen democratic norms and improve procedural justice.

Michael Lysander Fremuth: "Human rights thrive on change"

Human rights thrive on change – without their dynamic interpretation they would be doomed. They react to new risks as well as to social challenges and tensions.

When it comes to human rights, we must strive to find answers and solutions through discourse; this applies to climate change and AI governance as well as to defining the limits of freedom of expression and religion in increasingly diverse societies characterised by migration.

Democracy is usually conducive to protecting human rights and negotiating their terms, even if the relationship between the two may not always be free of conflict. Human rights, in particular freedom of expression and assembly, freedom of the press, freedom of information and the right to vote, in turn promote democracy, its processes and institutions. Tensions arise, for example, where majority decisions restrict the exercise of fundamental rights, resulting in a need to strike a balance between the protection of minorities and the democratic principle of majority rule. This is where human rights (often substantiated and safeguarded by constitutional courts) define limits for the majority, albeit rarely absolute ones.
 

Freedom of opinion and migration as stress tests for human rights

Two examples show that the development of human rights is not a one-way street and that protections may also be restricted. The first is freedom of opinion and expression. I prefer a broad interpretation, meaning that harsh criticism, satire and mockery of ideologies and religions must be possible, even if they annoy or offend others. Some courts are much more restrictive in their judgements. The line for me must be drawn where the individual begins, i.e. if an individual’s human dignity is negated or if there are calls for violence. At the same time, it has to be said that courts are increasingly willing to make more wide-ranging concessions in this regard.

The second example is migration. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg has derived various safeguards from the European Convention on Human Rights (in particular a ban on the forced return of refugees and migrants if significant human rights violations are likely to occur in the affected person's country of origin). At the same time, however, it has very narrowly defined its territorial jurisdiction and opened up political leeway for the states – for example, with regard to push-backs (editors' note: refusal of entry to refugees and migrants at the border) if the persons in question are attempting to enter the country illegally.
 

When pillars crumble

At an institutional level, I am less concerned by criticism of the courts – even when it is voiced quite forcefully by states, for every body exercising sovereign power must be able to withstand criticism – than by the dwindling willingness to comply with decisions and support existing systems. When states shy away from their responsibility – for example, when members of the Council of Europe, such as Turkey and Russia, until its expulsion, consistently ignore decisions of the ECHR, or when the US withdraws from the UN Human Rights Council and no longer acts as a powerful advocate of human rights at international level – key pillars of the protection of human rights start to crumble.

The state is more than just a 'service provider'

Ultimately, I find it worrying that the state seems to be shifting from a community of free citizens to a mere 'service provider' for passive consumers. This consumer mentality – "the state takes care of everything" – encourages belief in authoritarian promises and undermines the willingness of citizens to take responsibility and get involved. But there is no democracy without democrats!

I believe this can be achieved through education, a culture of debate – including the ability to tolerate dissent – as well as respect for others, for legal procedures and for court decisions. It also requires a society that is once again more inclined to discuss controversial issues openly, rather than simply trying to ‘sweep them under the carpet’ through legal means. We seem to be forgetting the fundamental conditions of democracy: the battle of ideas in a quest to find the best argument, discussing issues in a respectful way, information literacy, and the willingness to engage with a wide range of different people. Hence, human rights rarely mark the end of discourse, but are rather its beginning and provide a framework.

Enter the game. Join the discussion!

Want to explore the topic further? Throughout the 2026 summer semester, the University of Vienna offers expert insights right here in the magazine, as well as lectures and discussions on democracy and human rights. Also check out dedicated continuing education programmes on the topic. And don't miss the grand finale: on 22 June 2026, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk will deliver the keynote at the closing event in the University's Great Ceremonial Hall, followed by open discussion, networking, and interactive research stations.
 

All figures were recoloured from the V-DEM Institute Democracy Report 2026. Full citation: Nord, Marina, David Altman, Tiago Fernandes, Ana Good God, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2026. Democracy Report 2026: Unraveling The Democratic Era? University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute.